Rédigé par le Comité de rédaction de l’antenne à Menton de SPDS.
Introduction
The plans for a unified European defence strategy have existed for decades. Still, European defence continued to be plagued by a certain dichotomy: high collective spending, but low collective output, owing to the continent’s fractured national defence industries. However, the geopolitical shock of early 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, revealed the limits of relying primarily on soft power for continental security. In response, May 2025 saw the establishment of Security Action for Europe (SAFE) with an economic commitment of 150 million Euros in loans. The European Union stated that its attempt to federalize its competing defence industries is a response to “not only to Russia’s […] shift to a war-time economy, but also to uncertainties […] of a geopolitical situation.”
The difference between SAFE and other European defence mechanisms, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF), lies in its methodology and scale. Unlike the previous two, it is not merely a reimbursement scheme, but also an investment tool designed to incentivize joint procurement. The aim of SAFE lies in pooling demand, which the European Union hopes to help with decreasing costs, ensuring interoperability, and long-term contracts for manufacturers to encourage more production.
SAFE’s strategic approach is reflected in its eligibility rules. The European Union, recognizing that safety matters lie beyond national borders, has allowed specific non-EU/EEA states to participate in the system. Therefore, SAFE cannot be seen solely as an internal market tool, but also a geopolitical strategy to integrate non-EU/EEA states within a European sphere. This article will examine how SAFE interacts with two key bordering states of the European Union: Ukraine, in need of dire industrial assistance in its current battlefield, and Turkey, with one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) largest armies and its complicated relationship with Brussels.
I. The Ukrainian Exception
The possibility of Ukrainian inclusion in SAFE marks Europe’s transition from providing emergency aid to actual integration. Although the EPF, focused on delivering existing stocks to the frontlines, with SAFE Europe is aiming to integrate Kyiv properly to do production lines.
Ukrainian participation in SAFE is based on immediate need of better supply lines as the war has proven that the European “just-in-time” supply chains aren’t the most reliable, as shown with the problems regarding the production of artillery ammunition. The granting of Ukrainian participation further helps the block to acknowledge that the active defence of Europe is happening on the ground in Ukraine.
The effectiveness of SAFE will largely be dependent upon its capacity to create a harmony of standards across Europe and in Ukraine, whose army has been struggling because of a “zoo”1https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/ukraine-using-special-program-manage-foreign-donated-artillery/390322/ of different systems requiring different spare parts and ammunition. SAFE will incentivize the production of NATO-standard equipment across all participating states.
By funding common procurement, SAFE hopes to force a standardization of supply lines that extends all the way to Ukraine, helping the creation of a “military Schengen.”2https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20251211IPR32166/meps-back-military-schengen-to-help-withstand-potential-russian-aggression This way, not only troops, but also equipment produced in Germany’s Ruhr valley will be technically identical and interoperable to those produced in a SAFE-funded factory in Lviv. This interoperability will prove crucial to future Ukrainian safety by shifting the dynamic from sporadic donations and aid to predictable production quotas. This will also anchor Ukraine within European frameworks long before its political ascension, if that ever happens.
II. The Turkish Case
While Ukraine represents the moral imperative and the urgency of SAFE, Turkey provides a valuable window to focus on its “realpolitik” sides. The NATO member with the second largest army and the main supplier of Ukraine’s successful drone warfare, Turkey’s EU ascension process has remained frozen since 20193https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250502IPR28215/turkiye-s-eu-accession-process-must-remain-frozen. Despite this, the country may still occupy a distinct position within the SAFE network.
SAFE classifies Turkey as a possible “privileged partner,”4Mirel, P. (2017, June 12). European Union-Turkey: from an illusory membership to a “Privileged Partnership”[1]. Www.robert-Schuman.eu; Foundation Robert Shuman. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0437-european-union-turkey-from-an-illusory-membership-to-a-privileged-partnership a status which would grant Ankara access to specific procurement projects without full voting rights on the governance of SAFE. This presents a diplomatic compromise, one recognizing that Turkey’s exclusion would prove miyopic given its role in NATO and industrial capacity, while, at the same time, acknowledging security concerns of certain member states of the EU especially with regards to Turkish policy in Eastern Mediterranean. Currently, because of these political points, Turkey’s request to be a full participant in SAFE remains in limbo, despite strong backing from European states such as Germany5https://www.dw.com/en/defense-brings-turkey-and-germany-closer/a-74626914.
This partner status will allow European companies to tap into Turkish manufacturing to meet the massive volume requirements included in SAFE. While Turkey will benefit from European capital and certain high-end technology for its supply lines that weren’t previously available. However, this presents a conflict for certain critics, who believe that EU money should strictly bolster European production capacities in order to encourage European strategic autonomy. Still, proponents of Turkish participation highlight that European autonomy is impossible without the scale provided by its key neighbours. The mechanism of SAFE, therefore, provides a pragmatic solution to this: decoupling defence cooperation from the frozen ascension track, acknowledging that European security can benefit from a cooperative Turkey.
The most tangible benefit of Turkish inclusion lies in Turkish success in industries that European giants such as Germany and France have lagged, most notably in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The success of Turkish company Baykar, who is now exporting to various EU states such as Romania and Poland6https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/turkish-drone-maker-baykar-seeks-to-extend-global-influence/ – in conflicts ranging from Nagarno-Karabagh to Ukraine – is demonstrating the prowess of Turkish aerospace engineering. Francis Fukuyama went7https://www.persuasion.community/p/droning-on on to say that Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drones (that inspired8https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/23/bayraktar-armed-with-just-a-guitar-meet-the-man-helping-ukraine-resist-russia a Ukrainian nationalist war song) have initiated a new era of war.
Through SAFE, European armies can potentially engage in joint ventures with Turkish manufacturers that already are a part of the NATO supply line to rapidly fill capability gaps. However, with this inoperability comes the strategic risk of overreliance in Turkish production for key components and technologies. This, in turn, would expose the EU to leverage from Ankara in future diplomatic disputes, the reason why members such as Greece remain against complete Turkish inclusion. If Turkey were to contribute to SAFE to the level that it actually can, the challenge for the European governance board of SAFE will be to balance the efficiency gains from Turkish participation with the risks of tying European supply lines to a third state that has hardly had the best relations with Europe. This resulting dynamic will be one of compartmentalized cooperation where industrial ties may flourish while political relations could remain cool.
Conclusion
The Security Action for Europe is not just a fiscal stimulus tool for Europe’s struggling defence industries, it is also a geopolitical tool signalling the hopes for a self-sufficient Europe. It targets a critical flaw within European defence, fragmentation, and hopes to address it by common procurement.
However, it is also clear that European defence does not necessarily align within the political borders of the European Union. The integration of Ukraine puts SAFE to use as a direct tool for resistance against Russian advances, while the debate around Turkish inclusion shows the potential of higher efficiency for lagging European industries. As such, SAFE demonstrates that strategic autonomy is beyond isolation but about a carefully managed interdependence.
SAFE raises several questions for the future of the European project. If defence integration can proceed with non-members like Ukraine and Turkey, could this sectoral integration be the model for multi-speed Europe? As the EU hopes to rebrand itself as a hard-power actor independent of its ally across the Atlantic, instruments like SAFE suggest that the distinction between terms like “member,” “candidate,” and “partner” will become increasingly fluid in the face of common security threats.
Writen by KARAHAN Kerem Demir, First-Year Undergraduate Student at SciencesPo, Menton Campus.
Bibliography (American Psychological Association)
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